

# Corporate Bond Investing in Unprecedented Times

Steve Shaw  
Founder & President, BondSavvy

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
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## These 15 companies have one thing in common...

- Boeing
- Ford
- Disney
- Macy's
- TJX
- Marriott
- Delta Airlines
- Occidental Petroleum
- Royal Dutch Shell
- Anheuser-Busch
- Freeport-McMoRan
- GM
- Schlumberger
- Las Vegas Sands
- Raytheon

**...they have all recently suspended or reduced  
stock dividend payments...**



Dividend stock investors

Corporate CFO

## ...and, combined with pausing share buybacks, the savings – and negative shareholder impact – is significant

### Dividend & Buyback Summary (\$ in millions)\*

Company	12 Months Ending 12/31/19			Announced Through 6/30/20			12/31/19 Ratings
	Revenue	Dividends	Buybacks	Suspended Dividends	Cut Dividends	Paused Buybacks	
Royal Dutch Shell	\$344,877	\$15,198	\$10,188	--	66% cut	√	Aa2 / AA-
Boeing	\$76,559	\$4,630	\$2,651	√	--	√	A3 / A-
Disney	\$69,570	\$2,895	0	√	--	√	A2 / A
Anheuser Busch InBev	\$52,329	\$5,015	0	--	50% cut	--	Baa1 / A-

## While all 15 companies have reduced or halted both dividends and buybacks, they continue paying bond interest



- For many companies, it had been share repurchases – not total earnings growth – which increased EPS and boosted stock performance




- Dividends have proven unreliable for many companies compared to contractual bond interest payments



- Companies can suspend dividends at whim; however, corporate bond defaults are still a very small percentage of the entire corporate bond market

# Corporate Bond Default Rates by Rating

**Global Corporate Bond Default Rates: 1981-2019**



- High-yield corporate bond default rates have hit approximately 10% in the last three recessions
- Moody's said global high-yield default rates hit 4.7% in May 2020. It projected these default rates to peak in Feb '21 at 9.5%
- Per S&P, 2019 defaults comprised 35% distressed exchanges, 33% missed principal or interest payments, and 28% Ch 11 filings


Sources: S&P Global Ratings Research and S&P Global Market Intelligence's CreditPro®

**While defaults are generally limited to the lowest-rated bonds, the suspension of dividends by A-rated issuers such as Disney and Boeing provides bondholders a distinct advantage over stockholders for a significant amount of companies**

# Default Rates in Perspective

Even if high-yield default rates hit 10%, it's still a small percentage of total corporate bond CUSIPs

## Implied CUSIPs Going into Default Based on Default Rates




- Bonds rated below investment grade still represent a fairly small portion of the overall corporate bond market
- While we expect the lion's share of the corporate bond market to remain healthy, investors must still be vigilant given how quickly the fortunes of many companies have been turning


# Replacing Lost Dividend Income with Corporate Bonds

- Investors seeking to replace dividend income may need to invest in longer-dated bonds or bonds with higher credit risk
- While longer-term bonds will have greater pricing volatility, they generally rank *pari passu* with other unsecured bonds and are a more reliable income stream than dividend stocks
- Plus, capital appreciation should still be a key objective for corporate bond investors

Treasury and Corporate A Yield Curve \*




Treasury and Corporate Baa Yield Curve \*



\* Charts shown on Fidelity.com June 15, 2020 with market data provided by FactSet.

# In March, there were scores of investment opportunities across even the most high-credit-quality bonds...but investors had to act quickly

**Price Performance of Apple 4.375% 5/13/45\***  
Nov 29, 2019-June 12, 2020



For illustrative purposes only



- **March 3:** Fed Funds Rate cut by 0.50%
- **March 11:** Dow enters bear territory with 1,400-point drop
- **March 11:** Fed begins increasing balance sheet from \$4.3 trillion to \$7.2 trillion on June 10
- **March 15:** Fed Funds Rate cut to zero
- **March 23:** Fed announces up to \$750 billion in corporate bond buying programs: PMCCF and SMCCF


**To do:** Have a list of 3-4 high quality bond issuers whose bonds you can buy when the overall market falters

\* Pricing data shown on Fidelity.com as reported to the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA)'s Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE).

# Drivers of Changes in Apple '45 Bond Price

## Building Blocks of Apple 4.375% '45 Bond Price in 2020\*

Apple '45 Price: 121.83      135.91      96.69      131.78



- **Step 1:** Through March 9, the increase in Apple '45's price was driven by the Treasury rally, which was offset by an increased credit spread
- **Step 2:** The Apple bond's credit spread nearly doubles *and* Treasury yields increase, causing a 39-point price decline
- **Step 3:** Treasuries rally *and* spreads normalize causing a 35-point rally in the Apple bond



\* Pricing data shown on Fidelity.com. Spreads provided by either Fidelity.com or calculated using US Treasury historical data.

# How the Fed and Treasury Stepped in



- Apart from lowering the Fed Funds Rate and growing its balance sheet, the Fed built two credit facilities to purchase up to \$750 billion in corporate bonds, loans, and ETFs
- The impact on credit spreads and issuance has been significant; however, through June 30, the Fed had only invested \$8 billion (all in corporate bond ETFs)

## Summary Terms for the PMCCF and SMCCF

	Primary Market Corporate Credit Facility "PMCCF"	Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facility "SMCCF"
Eligible Securities	New-issue bonds and loans with maturities $\leq$ 4 years	Individual corporate bonds trading in secondary market with maturities $\leq$ 5 years and corporate bond ETFs
Minimum Rating	Baa3 / BBB- or had these ratings as of March 22 but were then downgraded to no lower than Ba3 / BB-	Same as PMCCF
US Treasury Equity Contribution	\$50 billion	\$25 billion
Last Date of Purchases	December 31, 2020	December 31, 2020
Status	No transactions through June 30	Purchased \$8 billion in corporate bond ETFs and \$1.5 billion in corporate bonds through June 30

# “If the Fed Builds It, They Will Come”

- The Fed’s actions increased confidence in the credit markets, which has driven lower credit spreads and record corporate bond issuance from March through May 2020
- There was \$788 billion of investment-grade US corporate bond issuance from March to May 2020 compared to \$1.1 trillion for all of 2019



# Good BBB vs. Bad BBB

Many market gurus have warned about lurking trouble in BBB-rated corporate bonds, but it's important to understand that not all BBB bonds are created equal

## Kroger vs. AB InBev Financials \*

- Kroger and Anheuser-Busch InBev (AB InBev) have very similar ratings; however, Kroger has much stronger financials
- Kroger represents what an investment-grade issuer should be: a very strong business with leverage less than 3x
- AB InBev has 5.1x leverage\* and weak performance in wake of COVID-19
- Investors doing their homework can find opportunities where a bond issuer's credit risk is not aligned with its bond rating

<i>\$ in millions</i>	<u>Kroger</u>	<u>Anheuser-Busch InBev</u>
June 15 '20 Rating	Baa1 / BBB	Baa1 / BBB+
Cash	\$2,726	\$7,169
Total Debt	<b>\$12,603</b>	<b>\$100,949</b>
Revenue (Last 12 Months)	\$126,584	\$51,108
EBITDA (Last 12 Months)	<b>\$6,028</b>	<b>\$19,903</b>
Leverage Ratio	<b>2.1x</b>	<b>5.1x</b>
<b>Q1 '20 Growth</b>		
Revenue	11.5%	-10.0%
EBITDA	25.2%	-17.7%
<b>Credit Spread (June 26, 2020)**</b>		
2029 Bond	1.05%	1.49%
2046 Bond	1.78%	2.23%

EBITDA – Earnings before income, tax, depreciation and amortization

\* AB InBev balance sheet data are as of 12/31/19 while its income statement figures are through 3/31/20. Kroger's financials are for the period ending 5/23/20

\*\* Credit spread data shown on Fidelity.com.

# Why Kroger and AB InBev Have Similar Ratings

- Based on industry, Moody's and S&P weigh different factors to determine a corporate bond's rating
- Since "Leverage and Coverage" only comprise 30% of AB InBev's rating, the other factors inflate its rating, which results, in our view, an undeserving Baa1 Moody's rating for the company

## Moody's Weightings: Retail Industry

Factor	Factor Weighting	Sub-Factor	Sub-Factor Weighting
Scale	10%	Revenue	10%
Business Profile	30%	Stability of Product	10%
		Execution and Competitive Position	20%
Leverage and Coverage	45%	EBIT / Interest Expense	15%
		Retained Cash Flow / Net Debt	15%
		Debt/EBITDA	15%
Financial Policy	15%	Financial Policy	15%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>

## Moody's Weightings: Alcoholic Beverage Industry

Factor	Factor Weighting	Sub-factor	Sub-factor Weighting
Scale	15%	Revenue (USD Billion)	15%
Business Profile	32.5%	Diversification and Exposure to Riskier Markets	10%
		Category / Brand Strength and Diversification	7.5%
		Global Industry Position	7.5%
		Innovation, Distribution and Infrastructure	7.5%
Profitability	7.5%	EBITA Margin	7.5%
Leverage and Coverage	30%	RCF / Net Debt	10%
		Debt / EBITDA	12.5%
		EBIT / Interest Expense	7.5%
Financial Policy	15%	--*	15%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>		<b>100%</b>

\*This factor has no sub-factors.

Source: Moody's Investors Service

# Macy's: Before and After COVID-19

The Fed's action has kept new debt issuance robust; however, the risk to bondholders has materially increased for many issuers such as Macy's

*\$ in millions*

	Feb 2, 2019	Feb 1, 2020	May 2, 2020
Cash	\$1,162	\$685	\$1,523
<b>Senior Debt</b>			
Total Capacity	\$1,500	\$1,500	\$1,500
Outstanding	-	-	1,500
Bonds	\$4,664	\$3,601	\$4,157
Total Debt	\$4,664	\$3,601	\$5,657
Last 12 Months' EBITDA	\$2,877	\$2,336	\$1,200
Leverage Ratio	1.6x	1.5x	4.7x
Net Leverage Ratio	1.2x	1.2x	3.4x


- 1** Macy's had paid down \$1 billion in debt during fiscal 2019, which enabled it to reduce leverage in spite of weaker operating performance
- 2** On Feb 1, 2020, there was no debt senior to the \$3.6 billion of unsecured bonds
- 3** Macy's draws down \$1.5 billion credit facility, which is senior to unsecured bonds
- 4** This increase in senior debt and substantial EBITDA decline has vastly increased the risk of owning Macy's unsecured bonds

# A Chapter 11 Case Study: Monitronics

**COVID-19** caused many companies to seemingly file for Chapter 11 overnight; however, it often takes longer to play out, as shown in the case of Monitronics' Chapter 11 filing

- Monitronics (“Moni”), a home-security company, had made attempts to improve its business; however, its performance began waning in 2018
- Its \$585 million of 9 1/8% 4/1/20 bonds were subject to a ‘springing maturity’ of the company’s senior loans and needed to be refinanced by October 3, 2019
- The company tried effecting restructurings during 2018 but was not successful
- Trading activity increased during Q3 ‘18, which enabled investors to sell at a reasonable price
- Moni filed for Chapter 11 on July 1, 2019, but, since it had restructuring plan approval from debtholders, it emerged on August 30, 2019

**Monitronics 9 1/8% 4/1/20 Price Chart**



Sources: FINRA market data, company SEC filings and news releases

# Monitronics Debtholder Recoveries

Moni's senior debtholders made out okay; however, this caused the bondholders to be left with minimal recoveries, which were primarily in the form of stock of the new company

## Monitronics Chapter 11 Recovery Analysis

\$ in millions	As of 7/1/19	As of 8/30/19	
	Chapter 11 Filing	Emergence from Chapter 11	Recovery
<b>Debtor-in-Possession "DIP" Financing</b>	\$245		
<b>Successor Senior Debt</b>			
Successor Revolving Facility (Undrawn)		\$145	
Successor Term Loans		\$150 ("A")	
<b>Pre-Filing Term Loans</b>	\$1,073		
Cash		\$150	
Fair Value NewCo Shares		\$100	
New Term Loans		\$823 ("B")	
TOTAL		\$1,073	100%
<b>Pre-Filing Senior Notes</b>	\$585		
Fair Value NewCo Shares		\$75	
Cash		\$2	
TOTAL		\$77	13.2%
<b>Total Debt</b>	<b>\$1,903</b>	<b>\$973</b>	<b>(A+B)</b>

Source: Company SEC filings and news releases

## Restructuring 'Reader's Digest' Version:

- Value of company is agreed upon
- Level of post-restructuring debt is agreed upon
- Senior debt gets first claim on keeping debt in the company or receiving cash
- Company will seek to eliminate portions of debt so it has a higher chance of survival
- Junior debt may receive a portion of cash and stock in new company (but not always)

# 'Best Practices' During Unprecedented Times

- Focus on companies with reasonable leverage (ideally 4x and less depending on company)
- Monitor, monitor, monitor, as the fortunes of companies are rapidly changing
- Know what amount of debt is senior to unsecured bondholders
- Have a list of 3-4 bonds with the highest credit quality you can buy more of in the event of a large market correction
- Be extremely disciplined following large run-ups in bond prices
  - “There are no called strikes in investing” – Warren Buffett
- Limit industry concentration
- In hard-hit industries, weigh an issuer’s ‘cash runway’ with how it is turning the corner
- In more speculative investments, lay out the upcoming principal and interest payments and invest *after* these are made





Thank you and stay well

Steve Shaw

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